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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
------------
-------------------------------------------
INSURANCE COMPANY OF NORTH 
AMERICA, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
LANSEAIR TRAVEL AGENCY, INC., 
et al., 
Defendant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
Case No. 166011 
This is a bonding company subrogation case brought by the 
Insurance Company of North America against Lanseair Travel Agency, Inc., 
Preben H. Nielsen and Rulon De Young. The action was tried before the 
Court without a jury. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
At the close of all evidence the Court dismissed the action 
against Rulon DeYoung and entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law and Judgment in favor of Plaintiff and against Lanseair Travel 
Agency, Inc., and Preben H. Nielsen. A Motion to alter and amend the 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and to enter a new judgment 
was denied by the Court. Preben H. Nielsen appeals from the initial 
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Judgment and the Order denying the motion to alter or amend the Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law and to enter a new judgment. No appeal 
was taken by the corporation. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Preben H. Nielsen seeks a reversal of the judgment against 
him and judgment against Plaintiff, no cause of action, and that failing, 
Appellant requests a new trial. 
2 
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STATEMENT OF FACT 
Lanseair Travel Agency, Inc., is a Utah corporation that 
maintains its principal place of business at Salt Lake City, Utah. Preben 
H. Nielsen was instrumental in forming the corporation in 1972 and at 
that time the corporate purpose was to engage in the business of travel 
agency principally in the State of Utah. (Tr. 5) Mr. Nielsen was a 
stockholder and director of the corporation and owned in excess of fifty 
percent ( 50%) of the issued stock. There were other stockholders however. 
In order to engage in the travel business, it is almost essential 
that the agency receive an appointment from Air T raffle Conference of 
America. Air Traffic Conference (ATC) is an unincorporated trade 
association formed by all of the domestic scheduled airlines in the United 
States. It maintains its place of business in Washington, D .C. When 
a travel agent is appointed an agency by ATC, that agent will then have 
in its possession the ticket stock and validating stamps of the various 
airlines. This enables the agent to arrange travel in its office, issue 
the necessary airline tickets and then bill the customer for the cost. 
The agent customarily receives a 15% commission on the airline business 
that it writes. The customer is benefited because, as in the case of 
many companies, they can arrange employee travel on a credit basis and 
all of the details of travel are worked out by the agency. 
One of the applications for agency status was introduced as 
an exhibit in the case. (Ex. 8) 
As a condition to the appointment as an ATC agent it was 
--
3 
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necessary that Lanseair furnish a bond in the amount of $10, 000. Both 
the Application for Bond and the Indemnity portion of the bond, a part 
of the application packet furnished to Lanseair by ATC, and the completed 
bond application was returned by Lanseair to ATC and not the bonding 
company. (Tr. 76-77) The bonding company is the Plaintiff - Respondent 
herein, Insurance Company of North America (I NA) • 
The Application for Bond and Indemnity Agreement signed 
by Mr. Nielsen are extremely significant in the determination of this 
case and a copy has been appended to this Brief. We ask the Court to 
be mindful that on the reverse side of Exhibit I and the last statement 
on the bottom of the page reads: 
"APPLICATION FOR BOND GIVEN BY TRAVEL AGENCY 
TO AIR TRAFFIC CONFERENCE, WASHINGTON, D.C." 
Mr. Nielsen did not at any time have any knowledge of any 
relationship between ATC and INA and no knowledge whatsoever as to 
the agent or broker with whom ATC conducted its INA bonding business. 
(Tr. 77-78) 
Shortly after the formation of Lanseair Travel Agency, Rulon 
DeYoung became the principal employee of the business. (Tr. 109) Mr. 
Neilsen had full time employment as an officer of Deseret Federal Savings 
and Loan Association and supervised the Lanseair Travel Agency. The 
business was operated successfully and all remittances were timely made 
to ATC for air transportation sold by the agency to and including the 
31st day of August, 1974. 
In the summer of 1974, Mr. DeYoung had expressed an interest 
in acquiring the majority of the stock control of the agency. Negotiations 
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between Mr. Nielsen and Mr. DeYoung resulted in the execution of a 
stock purchase agreement and promissory note on August 23, 19711. 
(Ex. 12) 
On that date (August 23, 19711) Mr. Nielsen wrote a letter to 
Air Traffic Conference, a copy of the letter (Exhibit 116) is reproduced 
at this point in the brief because of significance. 
"August 23, 19711 
Mr. John S. Rice 
Air Traffic Conference of America 
1000 Connecticut Ave. N. W. 
Washington, D .C. 20036 
Dear Mr. Rice: 
RE: Lanseair Travel Agency, Inc. 
1836 West North Temple St. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 811116 
Referring to Agency Rules, Resolution 810a, Section B, 
Paragraph ( 9), you are hereby notified that as of August 
23, 19711 the controlling interest of Lanseair Travel Agency, 
Inc. was transferred from P. H. Nielsen and S. L. Hardy 
to Rulon De Young, 1015 East 3825 South, Salt Lake City, 
Utah. 
Mr. DeYoung, who has managed Lanseair Travel Agency, 
Inc. since its beginning, has today purchased the stock 
held by P.H. Nielsen and E.L. Hardy (113,500 shares) and 
thus gained the controlling interest of said Agency. Mr. 
DeYoung has today assumed the position of President 
of Lanseair Travel Agency, Inc. and P.H. Nielsen and E. 
L. Hardy have resigned from their positions with Lanseair 
Travel Agency, Inc. leaving Mr. DeYoung free to name his 
new officers and members of the Board of Directors. 
Please change your records accordingly, and also be notified 
that P. H. Nielsen and E. L. Hardy will assume no personal 
liability or responsibility in connection with the future 
business transactions of Lanseair Travel Agency, Inc., this 
also applies to any possible personal liability or guaranty 
with the ATC bond. Please notify your bonding company 
of this change. 
5 
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P. H • Nielsen 
2899 Branch Dr. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117" 
Very truly yours, 
P.H. Nielsen 
The reason Mr. Nielsen wrote directly to ATC in connection 
with the sale of the business and termination of his responsibility on 
the bond is that was the only address he had ever been given. This 
ties directly with Plaintiff's Exhibit I, relative to the office to whom 
the bond application should be delivered. 
After August 23, 1974, Mr. DeYoung assumed full and complete 
control of the business affairs of Lanseair Travel Agency. 
It will be significant to note at this point that the ATC required 
the travel agency to remit the amount received for airline tickets less 
commissions on the tenth, twentieth and end of each month. 
The remittance to ATC by Lanseair was made and the check 
honored for the 30th of August, 1974. (One week to the day after Appellant 
sold the business and forwarded Exhibit 46 to ATC.) Thereafter, for 
the remittance period of September 10, 1974 the Lanseair check dated 
September 13, 1974 in the amount of $3,742.83 was returned "refer to 
maker". (Exhibit 10) Later, a check in the amount of $6,201.64 from 
Lanseair Travel Agency, Inc., to ATC on the 25th day of September, 1974 
was returned marked "refer to maker". (Exhibit II) 
The reason that these checks were returned to the maker is 
not clear from the evidence. By the end of September, 1974, Mr. 
De Young had ceased the business activities of Lanseair. The bank account 
6 
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of Lanseair Travel showed a balance at the end of August of $1!1,685.17. 
There were deposits to the account of approximately $10, 000. There was 
testimony also tha approximately $35, 000 was deposited in the account 
in September. At best the record on the balance of the account is 
confusing and the reason why the two checks to ATC (Exhibits 10 and II) 
were not honored by the bank is far from clear. (Tr. 126 - 137, 2311 -
HS) At all events, the first indication that Lanseair Travel Agency, Inc. 
would not be able to continue in business was a letter from Plaintiff INA 
to ATC dated September 10, 19711. (Exhibit 20) This letter indicates 
that the bond was cancelled that date and that the can:ellation would 
be effective October 10, 1974. Evidently a copy of this exhibit was mailed 
to Lanseair as well as ATC. The action of INA preceded the delivery 
and dishonor of the check dated September 13, 1974. (Exhibit 10) This 
check appears to have been processed by the First Security Bank in 
Salt Lake City on September 18, 1974 and returned as of that date. 
There is no reason for the bonding company to have cancelled the bond 
as of that date unless it had received word from ATC of a change in 
agency status and the revocation of Mr. Nielsen's indemnity agreement. 
Significantly, not one employee or other representative of INA appeared 
at the trial to explain this action and not one representative of INA 
even attended the trial. There was no evidence whatever produced by the 
Plaintiff to show why the bond was cancelled. 
7 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I: THE INDEMNITY AGREEMENT SIGNED BY 
PREBEN H. NIELSEN WAS REVOKED BEFORE 
THE DATE OF THE ALLEGED LOSS AND THE 
LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT SO FINDING. 
This point of argument and the following Point of Argument 
are closely related and both require consideration of testimony and 
exhibits relating to the Application for Bond (Exhibit I), Bond Verification 
(Exhibits 16 through 19), the Bond (Exhibit 15), and the letter of 
termination (Exhibit 46), letter to ATC (Exhibit 41) and Bond Revocation 
(Exhibit 20). 
The majority of the testimony relating to the case of INA came 
from Ms. Darlene Dolan, an employee of ATC in Washington, D.C. As 
noted above, no one from INA appeared at the trial or testified in the action. 
Ms. Dolan testified that she was a supervisor in the area of agency default 
but was not knowledgeable on questions concerning the bond, bond 
application and other correspondence appearing in the Lanseair file. 
(Tr. 184) 
Through Ms. Dolan, the Court permitted the introduction of 
Exhibit 15, the "Bond", over objection. (Tr. 153) The Court will at 
once note that the bond does not have appended to it a schedule of 
travel agents. The bond states as follows: 
"KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS that Insurance 
Company of North America, a corporation of the common-
wealth of Pennsylvania with the home office in the City 
of Philadelphia (herein called "Surety") is hereby held 
and firmly bound unto Air Traffic Conference of America 
8 
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(herein called "Obligee"), as agent for and on behalf of any 
airline member of Obligee contracting with Travel Agent(s) 
(as named in the attached schedule or as it may be supple-
mented from time to time by adding, deleting or changing 
names of Travel Agents therein) • " 
No one will ever know, if in fact, Lanseair Travel Agency was ever 
included on the schedule appended to the bond. Why it is missing is 
unknown. However, since no one from IN A appeared at the trial to 
explain this deletion or to supply a copy of the schedule we must assume 
that no such schedule exists. It bears a receipt date of August 10, 
197(?) although it is dated the 31st day of August, 1966 and it bears 
no identifying number. Note on Exhibit 17, as an example, that a 
so called schedule bond number 479771 is set forth but we have no way 
of knowing whether those premium period receipts relate to the bond relied 
upon by INA. Furthermore, the evidence was conclusive that Mr. Nielsen 
had never been furnished a copy of the bond. 
The importance of this exhibit cannot be underestimated. If 
someone is to be charged with agreement of indemnity it is only fair 
that the underlying agreement (in this case the bond), to which this 
indemnity agreement allegedly attaches, be identified and the adverse party 
given a opportunity to cross examine. It should not have been admitted. 
The Court is now referred to the Indemnity Agreement (Exhibit 
I). It is important to know that it does not contain any period nf 
duration nor does it specify the manner in which it may be terminated 
by either party. It does contain the following statements which are 
significant: 
"Undersigned agrees that surety may decline to undertake 
obligation applied for or may cancel or terminate the same, 
n 
J 
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and will return any unearned premium due on demand, all 
free of any claim for loss of damage by undersigned." 
"The Undersigned further agrees to reimburse surety 
for all expenses incurred in forcing the provision of this 
policy, and agrees to pay premiums annually in advance 
at a rate to be agreed upon." 
As shown by the evidence, the agency operated successfully 
through August 31, 1974. On the 23rd day of August, 1974, negotiations 
between Mr. Nielsen and the agency manager, Mr. De Young culminated 
in an agreement of sale. (Exhibit 12) The agreement is signed by 
Mr. DeYoung as President of the corporation and Mr. Nielsen and 
Mr. Hardy as stockholders. 
On that day, Mr. Nielsen directed his letter (Exhibit 4 and 46) 
to ATC stating that the agency had been sold and requesting that they 
advise their bonding company that he would no longer be responsible 
on the bond. 
Ms. Dolan testified that the letter, from Mr. Nielsen, was not 
in the Lanseair file. She did not testify that it was not received by 
ATC and admitted that fia-d it been received by ATC it would have been 
directed to someone other than herself. She did not know who that would 
have been at the time. (Tr. 189) Although she was not the person who 
would have carried out the instruction to notify the bonding company, 
she did testify that ATC would simply have ignored that request. (Tr. 190) 
Of course, that does not prove that the person that received the letter 
did not carry out the instructions it contained. 
The additional fact that clearly shows that the bonding company 
must have had knowledge of the termination of the indemnity agreement 
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is that before there was any question about the status of the Lanseair 
account, the bonding company gave the notice to ATC that it was 
terminating the bond. (Exhibit 20 dated September 10, 1974) No 
one from INA testified concerning the reason bond was terminated 
at a time when the affairs of Lanseair Travel were in perfect order. 
It must be concluded that they had in fact received notice of the 
cancellation of the indemnity agreement from Mr. Nielsen. 
Where an indemnity agreement is silent as to its duration, 
it may be cancelled by either party at will on notice. 
"A contract of indemnity continues in force only during 
such time as is expressly or impliedly provided for in 
the contract, and at no time is fixed for its duration, 
it is a contract terminable at the will of either party. " 
41 Am Jur 2nd, Indemnity, Section 8. 
The above principal is supported in the case of American Surety Company 
vs. Blake, 54 Idaho I, 27 P2d 972. 
The lower Court in substance found that Mr. Nielsen did 
not prove that the letter of August 23, 1974 was ever delivered to ATC 
or that INA had any notice or knowledge thereof and that ATC was not 
the agent of INA so that notice given to them would be binding on the 
bonding company. 
Those findings which are paraphrased above are contrary to 
the manifest weight of the evidence. It was shown that either ATC or 
INA directed that the indemnity agreement be delivered to ATC and that 
was the only entity with which Mr. Nielsen had any dealings concerning 
the bond. The letter was mailed by Mr. Nielsen and never returned to 
him. A later letter, by Mr. Nielsen (Exhibit 41), was delivered to ATC 
and was in their file at the time of trial. This letter was mailed to the 
identical address that Mr. Nielsen mailed the letter of August 23, 1974. 
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This, coupled with the fact that the bonding company terminated, for 
no apparent reason, leads to the inescapable conclusion that ATC had 
notice and that the bonding company also had notice. 
The bond in this case, admitted over objection, it unique. 
The procedure of adding or deleting entities from a schedule from time 
to time is not the usual methoe utilized by an insurance company to 
bond an insurer. Usually, an individual bond is written on each 
undertaking assumed by an insurance company. There are direct 
dealings between insurance company, the party bonded, and the party 
in favor of whom the bond is written. In this case, most of these lines 
of communication are absent. Legal interpretation of this type of bond 
is virtually nil except for the Hoyt case. 
The point urged by Mr. Nielsen is that inasmuch as INA had 
no communication with either Lanseir or Mr. Nielsen concerning the bond and 
indemnity agreement, INA cannot be heard to complain that notice to ATC 
of indemnity termination was not given to the property party. On the 
printed indemnity agreement appended to this brief it states: 
"APPLICATION FOR BOND GIVEN BY TRAVEL AGENT TO 
AIR TRAFFIC CONFERENCE, WASHINGTON D.C." 
Contrary to the findings of the Court, ATC was obviously 
the agent to INA to receive communications from indemnitors. Mr. Nielsen 
never had any communication from the bonding company prior to the alleged 
loss and no knowledge of the offite of INA in which to direct communications 
and would naturally deal with the same party to whom he had sent the 
initial application. INA is es topped from denying that ATC is an agent 
for the purpose of receiving notices under the bond. 
12 
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POINT II: BOND COVERAGE AND THE INDEMNITY 
AGREEMENT TERMINATED FOR NON-
PAYMENT OF PREMIUM ON SEPTEMBER I, 
19711 PRIOR TO THE ALLEGED LOSS. 
The attention of the Court is invited to Exhibits 17, 18, ard 
19 which are similar and are entitled Memorandum of Bond Verification. 
The significance of each of these documents is that the premium period 
in specified in each exhibit. Exhibit 17 shows the premium period from 
8/3/72 to 9/1/72. Exhibit 18 shows the premium period to be 9/1 /72 
to 9/1 /73. Exhibit 19 shows the premium period to be from 9/1 /73 to 
9/1/711. There was never any premium paid by Lanseair Travel or 
anyone else for any coverage beyond September I, 19711. 
To the date of September I, 19711, the agency account of 
Lanseair Travel Agency was in perfect order and the ATC was paid 
for all airline tickets sold to that date. This was specifically testified to 
by Mr. DeYoung. (Tr. 126) INA does not contend otherwise. The 
claim of INA is for airline tickets sold subsequent to September I, 
19711. 
Although elementary, it is well remembered that: 
" A contract of insurance must be assented to by both 
parties either in person or by their agent. There 
must be a meeting of the minds of the parties on the 
essential terms and elements of the contract. These 
essential terms include, in general, the following: 
(I) the subject matter to be insured; ( 2) the risk 
insured against; ( 3) the commencement and period 
of the risk undertaken by the insurer; (II) the amount 
of insurance; and ( 5) the premium and time in which 
it is to be paid." 
42 Am Jur 2nd, Insurance, Section 203. 
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In this case the commencement was September I, 1973 and the 
period was to September I, 1974. (Exhibit 19) The premium was to be 
paid annually in advance. (Ex. I) 
The conclusion to be drawn is that when the premium period 
expired on 9/1/74 the indemnity agreement terminated on that date because 
there was no insurance contract to which indemnity could attach. 
The case that supports this conclusion in all particulars is that 
of Insurance Company of North America -vs- Hoyt, 419 F2d 1148 (1969). 
In this case INA brought suit against an indemnitor on a bond issued 
to Air Traffic Conference where a travel agent had been included on the 
schedule bond. 
The language of the indemnity agreement appears to be identical 
with that of Exhibit I in this case. The individual indemnity agreement 
signed by Mr. Nielsen is identical. 
In the Hoyt case, the agent applied for inclusion on the bond 
in 1963. The application was granted subject to Hoyt executing the 
indemnity agreement. Likewise, in 1964, the agent was included in the 
schedule and again Hoyt signed an indemnity agreement. In 1965 the agency 
was included but no new indemnity agreement was sent. A premium notice 
was, however, furnished to the agency which was paid and the agency 
included on the bond for the calendar year of 1965. In June, the agency 
defaulted in the amount of $71, 000 that it owed to ATC. 
The lower court ruled that since a new indemnity agreement had 
not been forwarded for the year 1965 that the company was satisfied that 
there was no need for such personal guarantee. The appellate court 
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ruled, however, that the indemnity agreement was a continuing one and 
was in effect during 1965 when the default occurred. The Court also 
ruled that Hoyt's attempt to cancel his indemnity agreement prior to 
the loss was ineffectual. 
In the Hoyt case the loss occurred during the period for 
which a premium was paid. The Court then made the following observation 
on this subject which has particular application to our case. 
"The indemnity obligation had no definite term of duration. 
The agreements ran from year to year upon approved 
application, or, after 1964, upon payment of premium. Corydon 
paid the premium for the bond coverage for the full year of 
1965, and thus the agreements were in effect during that year. 
The facts here do not justify applying the rule from Mamerow 
-vs- National Lead Co., 206 Ill. 626, 69 N.E. 504 (1903), 
that a continuing guarantee, not limited as to duration and 
amount, will be construed to be limited to a reasonable 
time. The evidence here is plain that the indemnity was 
continuous, but its duration was terminated by the failure 
to pay in advance annually the premium required. " (Emphasis 
added) 
The distinction between this case and the Hoyt case is that the 
loss in the Hoyt case occurred at a time when a premium had been paid 
for coverage. In our case, the loss occurred at a time subsequent to 
the date of premium coverage. As in the Hoyt case, this Court should 
rule that when the agent did not pay a premium for coverage beyond 
September I, 1974 that the indemnity agreement was thereby terminated. 
That ruling is consistent with the only other published case on this 
subject. 
The lower Court ruled that coverage was effective through 
October 10, 1974. This ruling was based upon the fact that INA sent 
15 
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or delivered a letter dated September 10, 1974 indicating that coverage 
would terminate as of October 10, 1974. That ruling of the Court is 
totally devoid of any legal or evidentiary basis. 
The Court evidently based its ruling on the position taken 
by INA that the bond contained a thirty day cancellation clause, (Exhibit 
15) and a notice dated September 10, 1974 by INA stating that coverage 
would terminate on October 10, 1974. The Court committed a number 
of errors in accepting the position advanced by INA. 
As indicated above, Exhibit 15, the bond, should not have been 
admitted into evidence because its admission lacked a proper foundation. 
There was no schedule attached and it does not appear to bear any 
relationship to the bond number set forth on the premium period documents. 
The bond and the indemnity agreement are not consistent. 
The indemnity agreement provides that premium must be paid annually 
in advance. The bond contains no provision relative to premium. 
Neither Lanseair Travel Agency nor Mr. Nielsen were ever 
furnished a copy of the bond and the bond is not in any manner made 
a part of the indemnity agreement and none of the terms of the bond 
are incorporated in the indemnity agreement. 
The bond provides for a thirty day cancellation time. The 
indemnity agreement contains no such term and in fact states that the 
bonding company may decline to undertake the obligation and may cancel 
and terminate the same at its discretion - not after giving thirty days 
notice. 
More particularly, the Court misconstrued paragraph 5 of the 
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bond relative to a thirty day cancellation notice. This paragraph of 
Exhibit 15 reads: 
"If surety shall so elect, liability assumed with respect 
to any named Travel Agency may be cancelled by giving 
30 days written notice, sent by regular mail, to the last 
known address of Obligee and Travel Agent(s). The 
surety, however, will remain liable for any default occuring 
during the period up to the expiration of said 30 days 
notice." (Emphasis added) 
The key to that paragraph is the underlined words "liability 
assumed". INA assumed liability only for an agent who had paid a 
premium and only then during the period of time covered by the payment 
of premium. In this case, it ran from September I, 1973 to September I, 
1974. (CF. The Hoyt case where the premium was on a calendar year 
basis.) After the termination of the premium period, on September I, 
1974, the above quoted paragraph of the bond had no application. It 
applied only during the premium period. As an example, if the bonding 
company elected to terminate coverage on June I, 1974, it would be necessary 
that they give notice and coverage would terminate on July I, 1974. 
We do not know why INA took the course it did, since no one 
from that company chose to come to Court an explain these procedures. 
It certainly may be inferred, however, that where INA insures a thousand 
or more travel agencies it enjoys a very special financial arrangement 
with ATC and would likely want to protect that association. That, of 
course, is their business and their decision. However, they cannot 
unilaterally attempt to extend bond coverage, pay an alleged claim, and 
drag the indemnitor along with them. 
17 
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• 
The indemnity agreement must be construed strictly against 
the bonding company under elementary principals of contract. Its 
wording and all inferences drawn therefrom must be construed in favor 
of the indemnitor and against the indemnitee. 
The other point that the lower Court ignored is this: if the 
bonding company could select the date on which coverage would terminate, 
at what period in time does that right expire? The bonding company 
choose September 10 as the day on which to give notice. Why that date 
is selected is a mystery insofar as this record is concerned except for 
the fact that it may be logically inferred that prior to that date they 
had received notice that Mr. Nielsen had revoked his indemnity agreement. 
However, let us assume that INA chose November I as the date in which 
they would give notice. Would that be appropriate under the terms of 
the bond, the indemnity agreement and the bond verification documents? 
Suppose the bonding company had selected the date of January 15, 1975. 
If INA could select September 1 O as the date of cancellation notice, then 
logically it could select any other date on into the future ad infinitim. 
This is the effect of the finding of the lower Court and bears absolutely 
no support in the field of bonding law and indemnity agreements. 
There must be a time when an indemnity agreement terminates. 
That time in this case is at the end of the premium period. There is no 
other construction to be placed upon these instruments. The bonding 
company may choose to extend coverage to its obligee as a matter of 
courtesy or for whatever reason, but it cannot bind an indemnitor to 
that unilateral action. 
18 
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POINT Ill: THE COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING IN 
EVIDENCE AS BUSINESS RECORDS THE 
RECORDS OF THIRD PARTIES. 
As indicated in this Brief, the only person who testified con-
cerning loss was Ms. Darlene Dolan, an employee of ATC. The loss, if 
any occurred, came about by reason of the failure of Lanseair to remit 
to ATC funds received for the sale of air transportation with the various 
airlines. She had no independent knowledge whatever of either the 
amount or the extent of the loss with the exception, possibly, of the two 
checks issued by Lanseair in September that were not honored by the 
payee bank. 
The approach taken by INA in proof of claim related to Exhibit 
37, which is documentation prepared by Western Airlines, United Airlines, 
Hughes Airwest, Frontier Airline and Continental Airlines; Exhibit 28 a 
proof of loss prepared by Ms. Dolan; and Exhibit 36 a document prepared 
by one John L. Haymaker, Jr., who did not appear in Court. All of 
these exhibits were admitted into evidence over the objection of Defendant. 
None of the documents were prepared by personnel of A TC under the 
supervision of Ms. Dolan. None of the third parties who did prepare the 
documents appeared to testify, and of course, were not subject to any 
right of cross-examination by counsel for Defendant to determine whether 
in fact these instruments were trustworthy. 
In an interchange between counsel and the Court on the 
admission of these documents the Court erroneously set the legal basis 
for introduction in the following manner: 
"MR. GARRETT: Well, it contains heresay evidence again. 
Hearsay testimony. 
1 q 
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MR. DART: It's a business record received by the company, 
Your Honor. 
THE COURT: I'll let it in. Might as well let it all come 
in, huh? 
MR. GARRETT: I noticed. 
(Plaintiff's Exhibit Numbers 27 
and 36 received in evidence.) 
THE COURT: Well, you know, that's the modern trend, 
let everything in." (Tr. 182) 
Contrary to the position the Court took in regard to the admission 
of the hearsay evidence, the correct rule is set forth in 30 Am Jur 2nd, 
Evidence, Section 9 51 : 
"A book of accounts is to be regarded as a book of 
original entries notwithstanding, entries therein are 
copies from sales and other memoranda slips, tags, etc., 
if the entries were made in the usual course of business 
within a reasonably short time after the transactions 
themselves, and is admissible if supported by the testimony 
of others upon whose information the entries were made, 
to the effect that the statements are true, in addition to 
the testimony of the bookkeeper to the effect that he 
correctly entered the matter as stated by him. If the 
entrant made the entries upon reports of another who 
had personal knowledge of the transactions reported by 
him, then the entrant ought to be produced and required 
to testify that he made the entries correctly in conformity 
with the reports; and his testimony should be supplemented 
by the testimony of the one who made the reports, so that 
their combined testimony will be equivalent to the testimony 
of an entrant having personal knowledge . 11 
The rules of evidence have not been relaxed to the point 
indicated by the lower Court. The test of trustworthiness of evidence 
inevitably arises from a proper foundation and the test of cross exam-
ination. Neither of these fundamental legal principals had application 
under the Court's ruling. 
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POINT IV: THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO 
ADMIT DOCUMENTS IN EVIDENCE THAT 
PROVED AN OFFSET IN FAVOR OF LANSEAIR 
TRAVEL IN THE AMOUNT OF $7,572.87. 
Rulon DeYoung who purchased the majority stock on August 
23, 1974 and was in full control of the business of Lanseair Travel 
from that point to when it ceased business in the later part of September, 
1974, testified extensively relating to a credit due Lanseair against any 
sums or amounts owing to ATC. The documents comprising this credit 
were labled as a group Exhibit 45. Mr. DeYoung was asked to explain to 
the Court the exhibit and the meaning and effect of those documents. 
Each of the documents comprising Exhibit 45 represented either an unused 
ticket or a ticket that was paid for by the customer by credit card. 
Where the customer paid by credit card, ATC collected that money and 
not the agency. Where the ticket was paid for by cash or other credit, 
Lanseair remitted the amount of the ticket sale three times per month. 
The exhibit consisted of unused tickets that had been paid for by Lanseair 
or tickets that had been paid for by the use of a credit card. In both 
cases, according to Mr. DeYoung, these tickets represented monies to 
which Lanseair was entitled and for which credit should have been given 
against any claim of ATC. (Tr. 248-253) 
The Court refused to allow this exhibit into evidence. The 
Court did, however, permit a proffer for the record. (Tr. 255) At 
that time counsel indicated that the claim was in the exact amount of 
$7, 572. 87. This by way of proffer, for the record, after the Court 
had refused to consider the evidence of offset. (Tr. 255) 
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The Court did not think that the offset was a relevant claim 
against INA and so indicated in the record (Tr. 253) 
Each of the credits would have been reflected in the report 
of September 20 through September 30, 1974 to ATC, but no report 
was made. (Tr. 252-253) 
The matter of credit was called to the attention of the man 
from Frontier Airlines that came to the office of Lanseair in September 
of 1974 to pick up the stamps and ticket stock. Mr. Jeff Lyman advised 
Mr. DeYoung that he would be advised in the matter of credit. 
To say the least, the Court's refusal to admit evidence of the 
credit was a complete philosophical re..ersal of form. In the matter of 
the admission of the hearsay evidence submitted by ATC relative to the 
amount of the claim everything was admitted. In the matter of the 
evidence of offset against that claim nothing was admitted. This, although 
the modern trend, appears to be to let everything in. In denying 
evidence of the offset, the Court misconceived the law on the subject 
of indemnity and subrogation. 
A defense good against the obligee on a bond is good against 
the bonding company obligor in a later suit against an indemnitor. 
An example of this principal is contained in the case of Producing 
Properties, Inc., -vs- Sohio Petroleum Co., 428 S.W.2d 365 (Texas). 
:J !'I A 
"We think the rule applicable here is that when an indemnitee 
pays a third"p~rty's money claim against an indehtnitor to 
which claim the indemnitor had a good defense, the indemnitee 
is not entitled to recover against the indemnitor. Price v. 
Steves, 175 S.W.2d 450 (Tex.Civ.App., San Antonio 1943, 
writ re'f w. o. m.). See also 42 C.J.S. Indemnity Section 
12, page 580 and cases there cited. Had the Unit Operator 
sued PPI in March. 1967 or later on an obligation incurred 
January I, 1962 PPl's defense of limitations would have been 
good. Had the operator sued Sohio on the alleged obligation 
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To hold otherwise would mean than an indemnitee by 
the payment of an indemnitor's debt which is barred by 
limitations can deprive an indemnitor of its legal 
defense against the alleged indebtedness. Under such 
circumstances the payment by the indemnitee will be 
a voluntary payment for which it is not entitled to a 
judgment against the indemnitor under its indemnity 
contract." 
See also 111 Am Jur 2d, Indemnity, Section 36, 35 and the Restatement, 
Restitution Section 80. 
As indicated by the evidence, the credit to which Lanseair was 
entitled was mentioned to the agent of ATC when he visited the agency in 
September 1974 and picked up the stamps and ticket stock at the time 
Lanseair ceased business. 
The evidence shows that the bonding company paid this loss 
on only one document and that is the proof of loss submitted by ATC. 
(Exhibit 28) Two communications, Exhibit 23 and 24, preceded the proof 
of loss and appear to be form letters to INA or its agent alerting them 
to a potential loss. 
There is no evidence whatsoever that the insurance company 
investigated the claimed loss in any particular whatsoever. There is no 
evidence that a claims representative called upon Lanseair to determine 
the status of the account or to get whatever facts Lanseair had that 
would bear on the amount of the loss and no evidence that the data 
submitted by the airlines was accurate or factual. The only evidence 
of loss are the two checks (Exhibits 10 and II) issued to ATC which 
were returned to maker. These total $10,144.37. The offset is $7,572.87. 
The difference is $2, 571. 50. 
The indemnity agreement speaks of payments made in good 
23 
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faith by the surety. Payment on a proof of loss without any investi-
gation does not meet that requirement. INA could, of course, pay 
any amount due ATC on any evidentiary basis that it thought proper. 
But, if it later charges an indemnitor it must show that the payment 
was made in good faith. It would certainly seem that the good faith 
requirement of the contract would at least put the burden upon INA 
to show that it investigated the claim in a reasonable manner. This it 
did not do and produced no evidence to that effect. 
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CONCLUSION 
The lower Court seemed to adopt the attitude in this case 
that INA had issued a bond and required an indemnity agreement before 
issuance. INA paid a loss to ATC and was therefore entitled to reim-
bursement from the indemnitor in the amount of $10, 000; attorneys fees 
of $3, 000; costs incurred in the prosecution of the matter of $811. 85; 
interest in the amount of $24. 75; total $16,286.85. 
Not one person representing INA attended the trial or testified. 
The only evidence came from one employee of ATC. 
The evidence was clear: 
I. The the premium period expired September I, 1974, prior 
to the alleged loss. The indemnity agreement also expired that date. 
This conclusion is fully supported and announced by the only other 
reported case on this subject, which incidentally involves the same 
insurance company and the same type of bond and indemnity agreement. 
2. Mr. Nielsen effectively and legally terminated his indemnity 
agreement by letter written August 23, 1974. 
Appellant Nielsen is entitled to prevail on either of the foregoing 
principArs and the Court should reverse the judgment of the lower Court 
and dismiss the action. 
If the Court does not reverse and dismiss the action then a 
new trial is indicated upon the following grounds: 
I. The error committed by the Court in the admission of 
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evidence without proper foundation. 
2. The failure of the Court to allow the $7,572.87 offset. 
A 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this / 3 day of January, 
1980. 
Edward M. Garrett 
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lllSURANCE COMPANY OF NORTH AMERICA 
A. T.C. Schedule Bond Application 
Applies.ti.on le hereby made to Insurance Company of North America for lncluslo 
lj)pl!cant In a Schedule Bond in favor of the Air Traiflc Con!erence of America, 
1• Name of Travel Agency ___ -=L~an~s~e~a~1~·r._~Tr:..::a:v;P.:l;::-:A~e=n~c':'-::~I~n=c::';-.----__;~~--li'.9-~~~-(please print or type) 
0 !ndlvldual 0 Partnership 
2• Business Address 1836 West North Temple, 
3. u lndlvldual proprietorship or partnership, give name(s) and residence address(es) 
composing same (please type or print): 
Name N/A Address ________________ _ 
4, If corporation, give names of Executive Officers, or i! closely held, give, name(s) of Principal Stock-
holder(s) (Please type or print): 
Director 
President--'P,_...,H=~N=i-"e-=1-=s-=e-=n"----------~'-E,._.. •..,L"'._...H.,.ar,._,d,..y'-----------
Director 
Secret:irY.----------------'~---W,,,__. .... M.,..__.,D"'u""r""h..,a.m...._ _______ _ 
Principal Stockholder ________________________________ _ 
s. How long have you been engaged in the Travel Agency Business? new 6. How many employees 
do you h\l,ve ?_2 ____ 7. Do you bo_nd your employees 7 yes a. Do you carry burglary and rob-
bery insurance?_. ~y~e.,s.__ _ 
9. (a) Have you ever defaulted on a ~ontract? .!l.2_(b) Have you ever been bankrupt or lnsolvent?_.ru!_ 
(c) Are there any judgments, suits or claims pending against you? ..llll..-(d) Have you or any of ;•our 
employees ever been cancelled from the ATC .-\gency List? no If your answer ls "Yes" to any 
part of Question ~. give fl.l!I particl.l!ars on an attached statement. 
10. (a) Stat£ tot:il of your sales of tickets for air transportation wholly within the Continental 
United States during the last 12 calendar months immediately prior to the date of this 
application . • • . • . • • • • • • • • •.••.••.•••••••.•••••••• $......:..:N"-'/A;.::_ _ 
(b) State total of accounts receivable on such tickets for air transportation as of last _ __;•...;O...;O'----
Finar.c ial Statement . . . . • • . • • • • • • . • • • • • • . • •.••••••••••• $ 
(o) State the amount of total domestic air transportation sales (excluding your commissions) 
for each of the 3 highest months of the last 12 referred to in (a/ above: / 
Mor.th i_;:;N:i..t:;:.;A'----
Month _____ S-----
Month _____ :; ____ _ 
(d) State the aver:ige of the above 3 highest manths s NIA 
ll. Do you understand that these moneys are the property of the Carrier and are to be held by you orly 
u.'tfl sati~factorily •ccounted for and rer.litted to the Carrier? --------------~--'­
!!. Name and Address of Bank(s.) where moneys subject to this bond are depos.J.ted-----------
First Security Bank of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah 
ll. Amount of bond required (See Instructions) $ 10, 000, 00.4. E!fectlve Date Cbanue present bond from 
Barnes World Travel Agency 
IS. Do you have your books periodic:illy audited by a Public Accountant or c1P.A.? ~ 1! so, how !re-quently?..Year Ji:rive name and :iddress of Accountant and date of l:ist audit: _N>J.J.,A<io~----------
16
· FL~Al'CIAL INFOR~L\. TlON: Attach your most recent complete Financial Statement :is prepare.d~,.;bmiv.,v11cu-.r ____ _ 
''"
0
'uit:int .:;:'PLAINTIFF'S 
(over) 
Exhibit "A" 
::~ti"UCHl~f!' .: 
.;:-- ~'2-~~2~.J_:::c 
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INDEMNITY AGnEEMENT 
. . . 
The widersigned hereby a!!lrm(s) that the statements contained 111 tho forcc;olr.c; a;ipllcltloQ 
and are made without reserv:it1011 and that they are mac!i= to Induce Insurance Company of Xorlh ;,., 
herelllllfter called Sure~y. to Include the widorslgned In a Schedule Bond ls!ucd In favor of lie A/.r,, 
Coafcrence of America, Including any_ continuation thereof or any suceos:iory ob II gallon. t:ndcrsli:n~,. 
that Surety may declln_e to undert:ike obligation applkd for or may cancel or :cr:nlnate same OJ!d .. 
1
i-
uy W1earned premium due, on demand, all free ol'aisy claim for los11 or damage by undc;sli;ne~: ,: 
alderatlon of the Inclusion· of the widenlgned In the Schedule Bond as a!orcsald, the widcrslsntd 
1 
'1 
perform all the conditions o! all agreements entcre~ Into with Air Trame Conference of Amcrlc~\ 
capacity as agent for the seve_ral air carriers which are parties to the Air Tra!flc Con!erencei1 
Resolution, and will fully indemnify and save Surety harmless from and agalast any and :ill loss 9 
chargu, suits, damages, coWJsel fees and e.'Cpenses 9f wh_atever kind or nature which the Surety shatt'; 
or lnc~r or be put to, by re:i.son or in consequence of the Surety·havL"'lg Included the U."'lderelOll~' 
&!oresaJd Schedule Bond, or any contl::iuatton thereof or any successory obligation In the s:i:ne or u•' 
amount; further agreeing that Surety shall have the excluslvi= rtzi)t to adjust, eettle, or comproc4' 
alaim Wider thls obligation., and any voucher or other evidence oi any less, costs and expenses paid•.' 
faith 'by the Surety shall be prlma !acle evidence of t.'ie fact and c."tent of the liability o! the Wldar;' 
u well as of the respective heirs, executors, adminlst:-ators, successors and assigns or the ilnceri! 
The undersigned expressly waive(s) the bene!lt of :iny exemption to which the widersii;:ied l!laybe~ 
under law. The widerslgned further agrees to rel_mburse Surety !or all e.~pe:ises Incurred in~ 
!he provtafoDS o! thia Agreement, and ai;rees to pay premiums annually In advance at a rate to be aira~J 
Dated at Salt Lake Cjty, Utah thls __ _.2,,.9..,t .. h.__ __ day cif-...iI.1111_.,l;y;y~-,I; 
. ' . 
------------· Witness· Title ---'--'---
Atteet: 
Signature o! App!Jcant 
(i/ U,t/,'vitit1.J M ,., ••• aJtip) 
IF CORPORATION SJ~ Here: 
Lanseai:t Travel Agencv, Inc, t 
--~-· _ __,,-------------:::-------:By ___ -..1.~~(~~·am--e-""-~·::;z~r~~ra~t~i,;:._.;;;;::~:"":'~·~-~~"', .Secret~ry. Pr~. 
AGREEMENT 
To be exeeuted by the Executive Officers of s:iid Corpor:ition in their individual cap~cities, ore:• 
indemnitors\ 
In consider:itlon of the l'lsur;ince Compan)' cf Korth .-\meric:i executing the cbl!~~tic>n he_r~in :;;:·' 
and-warranting sw!icicnt intcrcst"in ;.:.pplic:int's :!!fairs and intending to bo? bound by J.pplic;i:.:'s ol:''.:• 
the undcrsii;ned jointly !ind severally hereby agree(s) to indemnify the Surety and JO>n(s) tn the.o .. · 
Indemnity Agreement. 
ure witti~· · "';' ·-~-~ ''•.JR / (-?fff!ft)(ia{~,/« ~·/ ~Title-
a,~:..~,.~_' "J>,! ! ;,.·~ :"=·...:. • '-...~ 
---------------------Title-
: - ~- __,;;,..:...~--~:~~-·~· ------------,--~·-~ ~>.··.~·-~_··.- t~ ~ .. t-."· · .. ·.• · .. ---------------------Title-
-- ~- :. ···-··-· .• 'f' ... ...... .... -
.APP.0C~J'IO::i'.FOR BOND GIVEN' BY TR.WEL AGENT 
.. TQ-_Alll·rR . .\fFIC CONF-q'l.ENCE, \\'ASll!NGTON, 0. C. 
- ...... 
.EB-220 1163 Print~d in \J.S . .-\ . 
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I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing ApRellants Brief 
was mailed to: B. L. Dart, Attorney at Law, 430 Ten Building, Salt Lake 
Lake City, Utah and Richard N. Cannon, Attorney at Law, 466 East Fifth South, 
Salt Lake City, Utah this c2/;;I- day of January, 1980. 
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